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Interview with Mladen Dolar
We would like to begin with the most obvious of all questions: 
how did you spend your time during the lockdown? Did you 
find any philosophically or even more broadly theoretically 
(or, if you prefer, even practically) interesting thing to say 
about it?
The lockdown was on the one hand like a sudden emergence of 
communism: we could be fishermen in the morning and the critical 
critics in the evening, there was suddenly a lot of free time at hand to 
devote oneself to hobbies (like playing piano), long walks in the nature 
(something I rarely have time to do, I fully experienced a true spring 
after many years) and reading the books one never manages (I reread 
e.g. Gogol’s Dead Souls which is absolutely astounding, and equally 
astounding, for very different reasons, Gulliver’s Travels; both have some 
strange oblique bearing on Covid). Even politically, there was an odd 
spectacle of conservative governments suddenly introducing ‘communist’ 
measures of serious social subsidies, state intervention, extolling 
public health service, even universal basic income, something deemed 
completely impossible a few weeks before. On the other hand this was 
like a sudden onset of nightmare. The class antagonism, gender, race 
and global contradictions became starkly apparent, Covid serving like a 
magnifying glass. The coincidence of the two, the (apparent) communism 
and the (very real) nightmare, spelled out in derailment, with no end in 
sight. If there is a notion that captures this state then perhaps Benjamin’s 
idea of dialectic at a standstill, Dialektik im Stillstand, which seems to 
have been waiting, lying low, for this moment to make its coming out. The 
standstill involves the heightened tension which is at a crossroads – there 
was a lot of standstill, but where is the dialectic? The pervasive wish to go 
back to normalcy is the escape from this tension, which also offered, and 
continues to offer, a chance of a different path.
To continue with a further maybe naive or, at least, rather 
general question: What, if anything, is a virus? It appears 
at first sight to be a mere biological entity. But all kinds of 
things, it seems, can go “viral”. Žižek recently even modified 
Hegel’s famous infinite judgment (“spirit is a bone”) such 
that it reads “spirit is a virus.” Virality may not be some-thing, 
but rather a quality or characteristic that expounds a strange 
ontological or phenomenal status or maybe even capacity of 
certain entities? What are your thoughts on this? 
At a certain point in the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel himself uses the 
notion of contagion, infection, Ansteckung in relation to spirit. This is 
in the chapter that deals with the struggle of the Enlightenment against 
superstition: the enlightened pure insight, he says rather surprisingly, 
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spreads like a perfume or a penetrating infection, and the consciousness 
notices it only when it’s too late. The infection is already widespread, 
“the struggle is too late, and every remedy adopted only aggravates the 
disease, for it has laid hold of the marrow of spiritual life.” Spirit acts 
as “invisible and imperceptible”, “it infiltrates the noble parts through 
and through and soon has taken complete possession of all the vitals 
and members of the unconscious idol; then ‘one fine morning it gives 
its comrade a shove with the elbow, and bang! crash! the idol lies on the 
floor’.” The last part is the quote from Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew, it 
displays how the silent weaving of the spirit (das stumme Fortweben des 
Geistes) undermines the idols that the superstition was holding on to. 
Hegel further speaks of “the infection by the Enlightenment”, implying, 
by extension, that reason is a virus. This image of spirit as contagion is 
striking, not only because it depicts the progress of spirit as an effortless 
viral spread, but more pointedly because this viral infectious quality 
was traditionally reserved for the powers of sensuality, passions, folly, 
‘irrational’ behavior and beliefs (like superstition); ultimately, matter and 
the material. There was always the tacit or explicit fear that the material 
would contaminate the higher spiritual realms. The traditional image is 
rather that materiality is viral and spirit is there to restrain and contain 
this contamination. Matter as a disease, spirit as a cure – the spiritual 
path was paved by purification. Sin is an immunodeficiency syndrome. 
But here Hegel reverses this image and conceives one part of spiritual 
advancement as coterminous with the spread of a contagious disease. 
But only one part, one side – the necessary flip side, its counterpart, is 
“the action of the negative essence” which presents “sheer uproar and 
violent struggle”. No way that we could simply rely on spirit as contagion.
The idea is tempting to see in the virus something that connects 
matter and spirit, something at their intersection, a common property they 
share, if properly conceived, and to construct from there a proposal of a 
‘viral ontology’. (Think also of a very elementary mechanism of mimesis 
which hinges on something like contagion (I wrote about it at some 
length). Virus appears as an external contingent peril, but at the same 
time it points to a dimension at the (extimate?) core of the human.
There have been many responses to the pandemic. Some 
thought to excavate its “deeper”, discursive, political, 
economic, or even ecological meaning. This often came with 
practical suggestions on how to deal with it and what kinds of 
perspectives or future potential it opens up. One of the most 
vocal commentators was Giorgio Agamben who published a 
whole series of texts/interventions that are now collected in 
the book A Che Punto Siamo? L’epidemia come politica (Quodlibet, 
2020). As you certainly know, he put to work his entire 
philosophical apparatus to try to shed light on the current 
crisis. Now, this obviously brings up some trivial points: 1) Is 
(t)his conceptual apparatus instructive and/or appropriate 
to make sense of the pandemic (and its political, economic, 
ideological and other diverse implications)? 2) It seems, with 
Agamben’s position as with that of quite a few others, that the 
statements about the crisis do actually shed some surprising 
light and sometimes even bring out in surprisingly direct form 
some tendencies or implication of previous and earlier work. 
Do you think this is the case (we are thinking for example of 
the idea that we live in a generalized state of emergency)? 
Did the crisis become a kind of hermeneutical magnifying 
glass that allows us to re-read the positions of the respective 
commentators (as if the rule applies: tell me what you think 
about the crisis and I tell you what kind of philosophy you 
have)? 
Pandemic in itself is not an event, not in anything like Badiou’s sense. 
Neither were the plagues in the past, the Spanish flu, the natural 
disasters, tsunamis, comets, etc. There is no deeper meaning or truth 
to it – except in the very general sense that our social life along with our 
biological life are contingent and exposed to contingency. A hundred 
years ago, nobody really asked the question whether the relation to the 
Spanish flu, with dozens of millions of dead, presented a moment of truth 
of various philosophies. Did it leave any philosophical trace? Not that I 
know of, but perhaps because it was more or less taken as part and parcel 
of the disasters of WW1. In 1755 the earthquake in Lisbon strangely was 
an odd philosophical event which shattered the Enlightenment faith in a 
meaningful, rational law-like universe. It was perhaps the first time that 
the very modern idea of living in a senseless contingent world took hold 
– look at Voltaire’s Candide, which, with all its naiveties, is a surprisingly 
radical manifesto. The pandemic presents a halt, a derailment of the 
capitalist economy, an opening, hence a possibility of an event, of a 
serious transformation, a bifurcation. Demonstrating that the present 
crisis shows how right we were all along in our philosophical stance (like 
this is the proof of the universal state of emergency, for instance, or to 
prove yet again how farsighted Lacan was) is obviously not enough. But 
it is very hard to produce a new turn, badly needed, to make a difference 
within the enormous avalanche of discourse that the crisis produced, with 
everybody called upon to comment. One speaks against great odds.
A follow up question: Agamben’s position has created, at 
least the impression or the effect that the crisis brought out 
some rather strange political and ideological affiliations 
between parties that one otherwise would not throw into 
one bathtub (excuse this image) together. This could just 
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be the effect of a strange mutual misrecognition (which 
in its own right could open up a whole series of discussion 
about “philosophy’s politics” if there is any). Some of the 
so-called “truthers” identified Agamben’s critique of the 
pandemic measures (of the lockdown and other restrictions) 
as expression of a political ally. The more or less recent 
protests in Berlin (in August) showed a surprising liaison 
of libertarians, conservatives, and others who all aligned 
under the banner of individual freedom (and Agamben was 
repeatedly a reference point of this mixed “movement”, if 
one may misuse this term here). In our understanding this 
seems to indicate that in the contemporary world (although 
not necessarily limited to it) the signifier “freedom” and 
the defense of individual freedoms or the freedom of the 
individual often and effectively functions in a reactionary 
way. Clearly, also philosophers – whose task has often been 
self-defined as presenting and clarifying or determining the 
concept of freedom – have been prone to it (this had already 
been Marx’s point). What do you make of this?
Pandemic produced strange bedfellows, with divisions among the left and 
the right. It seems that both left and right are split along the lines of e.g. 
wearing masks and complying with the imposed rules, a large part of both 
poles thinking that stricter measures should be introduced to protect 
human lives, and the other part thinking that this is an infringement on 
human liberties and an inadmissible state control. Both left and right 
are split on how to think ‘bare life’ on the one hand and liberty on the 
other. The voices on both left and right expressed a lot of concern that 
the emergency measures could be indefinitely extended once in place 
(along the lines of Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine), but there is also an 
inverse perspective: emergency measures involved a ‘communist’ hang 
(with many quotation marks), with enhanced public spending, investment 
in public health, social support, even universal basic income, ecological 
benefits, a tentative suspension of market economy, and one should 
strive to extend those, hold on to them, universalize some measures that 
governments were forced to introduce as temporary under duress. There 
is a good side to emergency, it showed that some insidious practices 
can be disrupted and that one can imagine a world where this could be 
sustained. Regarding the bare life, the dilemma imposed itself of stopping 
the economy in order to save lives. Either economy or the bare life? The 
whole world seemed to be caught up in this choice. But this is a false 
dilemma. Poverty kills far more people than Covid, lives of masses of 
people are far more endangered by the way that economy is run, and if 
we are to take ‘bare life’ seriously, than we first need a different kind of 
economy. Measures to protect human life in the pandemic only highlight 
how human life is expandable in the ways that capitalist economy is 
normally run.
As to the defense of freedom and individual liberties being used for 
conservative agendas, I absolutely agree. As Slavoj Žižek put it, there is 
nothing emancipatory in not wearing a mask, it’s a false struggle.
One thinker who was, maybe unsurprisingly, a constant point 
of reference was Michel Foucault (and the concept for this 
context was his concept of biopolitics). He was especially 
evoked to think through what was and still is going on with 
the strict measures that were imposed on the populations 
by the individual states in battling the virus. Let us put this 
as bluntly as possible: does the notion of biopolitics have 
the conceptual capacity to help to analyze instructively the 
present situation and our predicament? Or does it, as some 
show, display some structural, but also political weakness, 
especially in a situation like ours?
I am skeptical about the notion of biopolitics, particularly in the way 
it has become a buzzword, a passe-partout notion that lost any useful 
meaning (with Foucault, it definitely had the value of pointing to an 
extremely important historical shift, even if in many ways unsatisfactory). 
But let me take a different path and continue along the lines of the 
previous answer. There is another theoretical turn that seems to have 
been waiting for its moment and found a perfect opportunity with the 
pandemic, namely Lacan’s elaboration of alienation in Seminar XI, the 
vel of the forced choice, epitomized by ‘your money or your life’. As an 
aside, Jack Benny (the immortal Hamlet in Lubitsch’s To Be or Not to 
Be) used to do a famous gag where a mugger holds him up in a deserted 
street: ‘Your money or your life.’ When he doesn’t stir, the mugger gets 
impatient and aggressive, repeating ever more threatening ‘Your money 
or your life, buddy’. After an infinitely long pause Benny says: ‘Hmm… 
I am thinking it over.’ It seemed for some time, and it still does, that the 
world governments were largely saying ‘Hmm, we are thinking it over’. 
The point of Lacan’s demonstrational device is that if faced with this 
dilemma, one can only choose one’s life, the other alternative, choosing 
money, is void, an empty set, since one would thereby lose both life and 
money. And by choosing the only forced alternative, one retains life, 
but curtailed, écorné, life without money, the intersection of two circles, 
‘life with money’, being lost anyway. But is the choice of life, indeed bare 
life, the only way to squeeze out of this predicament? I always thought 
that capitalism can be defined precisely as choosing the seemingly 
impossible circle of money, thereby not simply losing life, but keeping 
the life at the intersection, i.e., life as subservient to and encompassed 
by the circle of money. You can keep your money and your life, but only 
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with life expandable in relation to the accumulation of money. (For the 
historical underpinnings of that, cf. Jacques Le Goff’s wonderful booklet 
Your Money and Your Life, 1986; oddly, the title of the English translation, 
Your money or your life, misses the point). The accumulation of money 
is fuelled by life, increasingly reduced to that function, as a cost to be 
reduced, and the other alternative, the choice of life without money, bare 
life, as it were, appears as an empty set. Thus capitalism is not simply 
alienation, but rather an attempt to circumvent alienation, to seemingly 
keep both life and money, but at the cost of an enormous curtailment. 
As for biopolitics, this provides a different entry point, not the relation 
of sovereignty to bare life (and this is the subtitle of Agamben’s Homo 
sacer), but the political economy as the real of biopolitics. This seems 
to be the blind spot of Agamben’s account; it’s not that the state of 
emergency displays the real of politics, i.e., the reduction to bare life 
by stopping economy; it’s rather that economy, in its normal run, is the 
politics of reduction to bare life. 
With Agamben, it’s rather strange, and I guess symptomatic, 
how the radical thought of biopolitics, sovereignty, bare life, state of 
emergency, etc. could be easily translated into the liberal defense of 
individual rights against the state infringement. Is this the prospect?
Some, maybe many, and especially on the left, perceive 
the state as an enemy. There is a widespread and profound 
distrust of the state and its actions, decisions, etc. And, of 
course, there are very good reasons for this distrust. But we 
wondered if the pandemic has not actually added another 
dimension or aspect to this discussion and we might best 
articulate it in the following question: Can the state have an 
emancipatory function (perhaps here the reference would 
be Hegel and not Marx), or is this as paradoxical as stating 
that we are in the situation where there is not the “state and 
(then the) revolution”, but “the state as revolution”? How 
do you see the relevance of the state in our contemporary, 
viral present? That is to say, can the state be turned into a 
site of collective emancipation, rather than just serving as 
an apparatus that ensures the reproductive expansion of the 
anarchic movement of capital? 
In 1917 Lenin wrote State and Revolution, a text leading up to and paving 
the way for revolution, with the prospect of revolution dismantling 
the state as an apparatus of class oppression; not just that particular 
oppressive and reactionary state, but state as such, as an instrument 
of oppression by its very concept. Curiously and by sheer coincidence, 
in 1917 Franz Rosenzweig discovered a short manuscript which became 
famous as ‘the oldest systematic program of German idealism’, co-
written by Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling in the aftermath of French 
Revolution. There they expounded that there can be no idea of the state 
since it contradicts the very idea of an idea, it contradicts freedom, it 
treats human beings mechanically as cogwheels, therefore it must cease 
(also soll er aufhören). In the aftermath of the revolution, the three young 
lads entertained the idea of doing away with the state as such, and Lenin 
as if picked it up in view of another revolution. But Hegel’s subsequent 
development could be rather summed up by “Revolution and State” – his 
problem was, particularly in his Philosophy of Right, how to conceive of 
a state that would capture the spirit of revolution and find a form that 
would make it endure, that could be an enduring social form of freedom. 
Revolution by its own logic could only run amok by the frenzy of its own 
negativity, hence the necessity of the state. So state as the result of 
the revolution, not revolution as the undoing of state. This is in line with 
Hegel’s basic move that negativity must have a positive expression. I am 
in sympathy with this basic Hegelian move, and I think that there was a 
big deficiency on the left not to have come up with a theory of the state, 
merely seeing it as an opponent to be abolished. This came back with a 
vengeance, in Stalinism and all the ‘really existing socialism’, with the 
imposition of the worst kind of state as a monster. The point would be 
to see the state not simply as an enemy or an ally, but as a site, a site 
of political struggle, not simply conceiving politics as something that 
happens outside and against the state – indeed the oxymoronic ‘state as 
revolution’. The agenda of undoing the state has in the meantime become 
the right-wing neoliberal agenda, where they managed to defuse state 
mechanisms far more successfully than any left wing politics, in order 
to give the alleged free reign to economy, while at the same time, when 
deregulation leads to disaster, imposing the biggest state intervention 
into economy in human history, with the colossal bail-outs in the wake of 
2008 crisis. 
The pandemic has produced effects on at least three levels: 
on that of public health, that of economy, but also the level 
of mental health. The statistics concerning the latter are 
worrying (depression, suicidal tendencies, anxiety, etc.). Do 
you see any specific (new, old or just renewed) function of 
psychoanalysis in the pandemic situation?
I am not a practitioner, so I have no direct experience of how the Covid 
crisis affected analytic practice. I hear from my analyst friends that a lot 
of it massively moved to Zoom, and I can’t quite imagine how the basic 
simple parameters of the analytic situation that Freud proposed can be 
maintained, or adapted, and whether this is sustainable in a longer run. 
Even in the academic sphere, which suddenly largely happens through 
Zoom, I don’t think this can be maintained without a huge loss; it’s a 
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maimed surrogate, so this goes all the more for the analytic practice 
where this has far more intimate consequences.
I think psychoanalysis was in bad trouble before, in serious crisis 
in comparison to its heyday in the seventies and the eighties that I have 
a very vivid memory of. Partly because of the massive psycho-chemistry 
industry, with pills for every psychic disturbance (with anti-depressants 
at the top of the list), partly because of the rise of a vast variety of 
therapies, apparently efficient in the short run (from cognitivism to new-
age), partly because of the sad sectarian in-fights among the analysts 
and their organizations (nothing sadder than Lacanians viciously fighting 
other Lacanians as to who is the true Lacanian, not noticing how they are 
becoming collectively irrelevant thereby), and above all because of the 
decline of the impact of critical thought in the neo-liberal times, which 
has multiple causes and where psychoanalysis shares the fate of others. 
One could hope against hope that this crisis may offer an occasion for 
a theoretical and practical renewal that psychoanalysis badly needs, as 
does the critical thought at large. One can be reminded that it was after 
WW1 that Freud wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle, one of his most 
far-reaching texts, occasioned also by a response to a catastrophic crisis 
brought by the war and its aftermath. 
Crises always open the space for interventions, measures, and 
actions of different kinds (political, economic, ideological, 
etc.). In our current situation, it thus far seems that the 
right, in some parts of Europe, proved quite capable in 
hegemonising interpretations and interventions. In Germany, 
it was rather the conservative powers who did, at least in the 
beginning, quite a successful job in containing the situation 
(it remains to be seen how the situation in the US or India 
will evolve). But if a crisis can present an opportunity for a 
political intervention, did you see any relevant proposal from 
any European or International left? What is your view of the 
current political situation?
It seems nevertheless that some moderately left governments, like New 
Zealand, Scandinavian countries (with the strange exception of Sweden), 
etc. were the most successful in containing Covid, and that new right-
wing leaders like Trump, Johnson, or Bolsonaro, were among the most 
pernicious and harmful for their populations. The epidemic gave rise to a 
lot of fear and anxiety, the breeding ground of populism, but they rather 
displayed sheer incompetence and disregard for people’s lives. There are 
too many exceptions for this rule of thumb to quite hold, and the data for 
many countries (like India) are largely unreliable. But this is just judging 
from the available data, but facts are not quite the name of the game, 
there is indeed a battle for hegemony and ideological interpretation going 
on where the right appears to have the upper hand, where disasters can 
be presented as victories. This is the time when what would be most 
dearly needed is an international association of the left, linked to the 
new rise of the green movement, with a common minimal agenda, like 
the boost of public health, the concerted protection of the most exposed 
and vulnerable, the radical ecological measures, universal income in 
some form etc. Where is it? Who will seize the moment? Varoufakis’s 
Progressive International, conceived together with Sanders? I very much 
wish that such initiatives may gain momentum. But the situation is such 
that help may come from completely unexpected quarters, sparked by a 
contingent constellation; it’s ripe for a spark.
There is barely any left government in Europe left (be it social-
democratic, socialist, or whatever). Certainly, the traditional 
left proved incapacitated so many times already and so inapt 
to propose basic solutions to fundamental problems that it 
barely deserves the name (of the left) – which led Badiou to 
suggest that one should simply stop using the terms of left 
and right altogether. But on top of the absence of the “left” – 
whatever we mean by this – from positions of power, the EU 
seems to be totally out of sync with actual political decision 
making processes. Everything – maybe tragically – seems 
to point to its unavoidable dissolution (the ongoing refugee 
situation is not even mentioned in times of the virus). Is there 
any future for Europe in and after the virus? 
There was a time in the nineties when the vast majority of European 
governments were left-wing, kind of, and this is the crucial time to 
consider in view of the present situation. Namely, the neoliberal 
hegemony that we witnessed in the past few decades could only succeed 
when the left actually largely espoused it as the platform within which 
they could parade as ‘the right with a human face’. People like Blair, 
Clinton, and Schröder made it possible that the neoliberal agenda 
could gain general currency and be presented as acceptable, even the 
only viable, while in the eighties Reagan and Thatcher still appeared as 
extremists and fundamentalists. The left then abandoned the agenda of a 
lasting social transformation, something that moderate social democrats 
like Brandt, Palme, and Kreisky still stood for in the seventies – they 
would be considered as dangerous leftists today, while we spurned them 
at the time as meek reformists. Today Piketty seems to be something 
like a reincarnation of their spirit. The left then adopted the neoliberal 
assumptions and shifted the terrain of the political strife to the question 
of the degree and shading – do we want a bit more or a bit less state 
intervention or deregulation or welfare state? The difference between the 
left and the right tends to be defined by cultural, not political, agendas, 
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increasingly so. Given that the left largely espoused the neoliberal 
agenda, and was only able to function as a reaction against rightest 
moves without having a project of its own, this also resulted in the 
absence of a serious response to the 2008 crisis, which should have been 
the wet dream of the left. 
Despite the sad state that Europe currently presents, and which 
looks even sadder with the Covid crisis, I still think that fighting for 
Europe is absolutely necessary, and that abandoning EU as a hopeless 
case is no solution. In the global context where US, China, and Russia 
loom large as the biggest players, Europe stands for the possibility of 
a prospect of another political agenda, even if tentatively and modestly 
negatively defined against the three above. Perhaps not much, but 
something to hold on to; an incentive to desperately fight for solidarity, 
social justice, liberty and equality which are the essential European 
legacy, to be reinvented.
One of the characteristics of the self-declared left critique 
consists in reflecting on new, or at least specific and 
conjunctural phenomena (say, Bolsonaro, or Trump) by 
recourse to old categories or concepts (insinuating for 
instance, that they are fascist). We tend to disagree with 
this trend, since it does not only express a lack of historical 
specificity but even more so an unwillingness to be irritated 
by what is unpleasant to confront. If we take Bolsonaro as one 
case, we will see that Catholicism and neo-Pentecostalism 
were instances in Brazil that among other things played 
a determining structural influence in his election (so one 
should take into account the historically specific status of 
the Workers’ Party, the nature of the populist left in Brazil, 
etc.). Of course, this election must also be comprehended 
against the background of the right assimilating nominally 
anti-corruption politics (from the left) – simply because when 
the corrupt are in power, they redefine what corruption is 
and in the specific case of Brazil against the background of 
Rousseff’s corruption charges and the entire leftish politics 
of Lula (who learnt from the right and started handling 
corruption strategically). We do not think we live in a 
classically fascist period and find it even more absurd to seek 
to trace proto-fascist elements in contemporary discourses 
(as if before there is fascism, there are already traces of 
fascism). It is quite clear that if fascism is a name for a 
politics that classically included both economic and political 
directives, today’s capitalism simply does not provide the 
economic basis for early 20th century fascism. So, our (very 
schematic) thesis is that what we are seeing with the alt-right 
is something else; a reactionary or even obscure novelty, 
new obscurantism and reactionaries. This might certainly 
get much worse, but it deserves a new analysis and its logic 
needs explicitation. Would you agree that there is strangely 
something different, if not new going on on the right and the 
same does not hold true for the left? If this were the case, does 
this indicate an exhaustion or saturation of a certain logic or 
idea of the left? 
I won’t say anything about Brazil, your question shows a much better 
grasp of the situation there than I have, so I can only largely agree. And 
I definitely agree about the use of the term fascism. I guess it shows a 
certain inertia of thought on the left, with all the new alarming phenomena 
being put under the heading of the avatars of old phenomena. Any excess 
or any display of authoritarian measures is quickly labeled as fascism, a 
handy and extreme marker that appears a bit like a black hole, and the fact 
that one uses it can function as the alibi of one’s radical stance. There are 
several problems with that: first, the very term fascism stirs up immediate 
affective reaction and can be used as an easy trigger, and its message 
is most often: don’t reflect, but react. The label calls for immediate and 
strong reaction. It also has an immediate effect of stigmatization, the 
opponent is stigmatized instead of being addressed, considered as stupid 
and blind, thus an occasion for proving our superiority. The use of this 
term is mostly not something that can change things, it often makes them 
worse. But the problem is not only with the way this term most often 
functions, but also with its content. The new populisms present surprising 
new facets that confound their critics. Terry Gilliam, of Monty Python fame, 
famously said that “not even the Pythons in their 1960s pomp could match 
the surreal madcap nature of the presidency. […] The reality is funnier than 
anything one can do.” Trump is a better parody of himself than any parodist 
can do. The new leaders are often designated as clowns and buffoons 
(Berlusconi was paving the way), which doesn’t impede their political 
agenda, but enhances it. The obscene underside of power has come to 
the fore, in massive and incredible ways, which would have undone any 
previous power, but now functions as its asset. 17,000 lies and more can 
be told, all easily checked, without this having any consequences – which 
gives a whole new dimension to the paradox of the Cretan liar. It’s not 
that now the usually hidden and repressed content has made its coming 
out, so that we could witness the concealed truth of power; it’s rather that 
the repression itself has become repressed, I guess to an unprecedented 
degree, the more the obscenity is out in the open. The Emperor acts as if 
he takes off his clothes and enjoys displaying his nudity (I am following 
the cue of an excellent text by Yuval Kremnitzer, The Emperor’s New Nudity, 
soon to be published), which coincides with utmost obfuscation. This 
shifts the very notion of ideology and its classic parameters. Furthermore, 
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there is the sheer inconsistency of statements and policies (cf. the array 
of Trump’s contradictory lines about Covid), different in tenor and scope 
from the ‘old right’, and also following a different logic than fascism. 
The paradox is to pursue a consistent political line made of blatant 
inconsistencies, but a line that sticks and cannot be halted by debunking 
inconsistencies. And there is a new logic of transgression, in particular 
transgression of unwritten rules that form the texture of society, let’s say 
the rules of common decency, civility, respect and dignity – a seemingly 
daring constant transgression that serves the preservation of the status 
quo and its enhancement. The populist politics is fuelled by a deep anti-
establishment sentiment (deep state, swamp, etc.), which is immediately 
put into the service of the protection of the establishment. The specter of 
corrupt establishment is maintained for the rage to continue, so that the 
real establishment can remain intact.
I am enumerating a bit haphazardly some traits and paradoxes 
(there are more) of the new populism which cannot be covered or usefully 
dealt with by squeezing them under the label of fascism. The trouble 
with this is that the left (including myself) is pretty good at drawing up a 
gloomy picture, but there is the danger that this still betrays a fascination 
with it and fatefully allows it to occupy the center-stage and set the 
agenda. We spend our time in awestruck indignation, helplessly reacting 
to ever new horrors that one deemed impossible a week ago. I guess the 
only way out of this is, well, to start doing politics, instead of righteous 
indignation, not as a reaction, always some steps behind, but on our own 
terms – a promise of this could be sensed with Bernie Sanders, before the 
Democratic establishment opted for the return to the old normalcy which 
produced Trump in the first place.
To follow up: what is so seductive about identity politics, 
political correctness, populism, etc., that the left seems 
to have embraced? If against previous left wing rule-
violations have been assimilated by the right (who are right 
now breaking all rules constantly) and forced the left into 
a political correct mode of operation, this seems to be a 
deadlock (as this makes for a left that can only insist and 
reiterate rules of behavior and rules of discourse and thus 
sounds rather quite conservative in the classical meaning 
of this denomination). Do you see anything emancipatory in 
any of this and if not, how to break this unhappy conundrum? 
Does the current pandemic offer a potential way out (since 
now it is the rather right wing forces governing that have to 
impose rules of behavior)?
Regarding identity politics I can make two brief general comments, from 
the psychoanalytic and the Hegelian perspective. Tellingly, the key term 
in psychoanalysis is identification, not identity. Identification entails 
a contradictory process full of tension and with uncertain results. It’s 
a process, not a state of identity that one would have to protect and 
perpetuate. Thus any sexual position is ridden with the impossibility of 
coming to terms with the sexual difference, which is not the difference 
masculine/feminine (if the sexual difference were reducible to this 
simple binary, there would be no need for psychoanalysis). There is a 
real of sexual difference irreducible to a binary opposition, ultimately 
to the signifier, and irreducible to a positive identity. Lacan has a 
great formulation for this: it is what doesn’t cease not to be written, 
yet haunting any given oppositions, exceeding the binary logic. The 
multiplicity of sexual positions is the response to this impossibility, but 
the assertion of this multiplicity doesn’t resolve its deadlock. Of course 
one should fully endorse the struggle of all sexual ‘identities’, their right 
for full recognition, but this is not enough – one should show fidelity to a 
kernel of antagonism that they all have at their core and which prevents 
us from ever simply inhabiting any sexual identity. This tends to get 
lost in the assertion of the multiplicity of positions which all have equal 
rights and entitlement. The sexual politics that psychoanalysis proposes 
is far more troubling, it doesn’t aim only at the external proponents of 
oppression, but at the inner rift implied by sexuality. (I cannot do better 
but to refer to Alenka Zupančič’s book What is sex?) 
As for Hegel, one should just keep in mind the general caveat that 
any identity is premised on a split, and that any identity is subject to self-
othering (Sichanderswerden), being itself only on condition of becoming 
other than itself, and measured against the other at its core. There can be 
no Hegelian identity politics. 
Following these two cues one can see that the deadlock of asserting 
the identity politics and political correctness on the one side, and following 
the path of daredevil transgression on the other is fatally misconceived. 
Asserting identity politics tends to betray what identities have at their 
core, the antagonistic inner edge (as opposed to external enemies), and 
seemingly daring transgression ultimately sustains the power structures 
that it is allegedly transgressing. It’s a quid pro quo, indeed a conundrum 
hard to undo, the two strands often fuelling each other. As to what one 
can do – well, pursuing the Hegelian-Lacanian line at this particular 
intersection (concerning identity and transgression), but this then poses 
the larger question of what philosophy can do in these times.
During the lockdown, one of the claims spread everywhere 
was: “we are all in the same boat”. But, we have seen the 
“emergence” or the new visibility of a fraction of the working 
class, so called essential workers. Would you say they can 
be accounted for in the terms of Marx's analysis? And if so, 
what does one do with the idea that there was a widespread 
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recognition of the achievements and efforts of the essential 
workers (of people whose work is so essential that without 
them the functioning of society would come to a halt) that 
immediately after the virus seem to have disappeared or 
lowered its impact were again forgotten and disappeared into 
the invisibility of the supermarket checkout counters and the 
like? First there was literal acclamation (in Italy people stood 
on their balconies and applauded the supermarket cashiers), 
then there was a demand for higher wages, and then all this 
disappeared with the objects of the acclamation. What does 
this mean for the idea of (the) essential work(ers)? Can Marx 
and the critique of political economy in general help the 
conditions of the pandemic?
If the pandemic showed anything, then that we are not in the same boat. 
The inequalities and antagonisms deepened and drastically came to 
the fore. There was a graffiti in Ljubljana ‘Homeless, stay at home!’ 
The drastic differences of those who have a home to stay at, and the 
people in appalling housing circumstances, the gender differences, with 
women being far more exposed in caring and medical professions, as 
salespersons, plus subjected to increased domestic violence, the carnage 
of the old (no countries for old men), the penury of the precarious workers, 
the looming poverty, the exposure of racial and ethnic minorities. The image 
of all being in the same boat has the further hidden implication that boats 
are hierarchical entities, there is a captain at the top and some officers 
in command, and the others are to obey the orders. It seems to proclaim 
equality, but it does the opposite, hence the boat is a propitious ground 
to introduce authoritarian measures under the cover of all being equally 
vulnerable. The message is: because we are all equal in regard to the virus 
you should concede ‘our’ unquestionable power for your own good.
The talk about essential workers rather obscures some things. First, 
such talk obscures the real problem of the role of the state and the public 
services. Only a well-organized public health service can deal with such 
an emergency situation (but not only that, also the health care freely 
available for all), and the general thrust for privatization and deregulation 
impoverished and depleted this service in the decades of neoliberal 
policies – the degree of it became glaring under the harsh light of the 
virus. There was a moment of consensus about that in the spring crisis (if 
unwilling and frail), but quickly forgotten once the peak danger seemed 
to be over. Nothing was seriously done in the past six months to avert and 
mitigate the current second crisis, with the looming new disasters. The 
‘essential’ health workers are now even more exploited and poorly paid, 
and nobody applauds them any longer. 
Second, the larger issues of the visibility of the working class – 
indeed it’s invisible in the normal conditions, and this doesn’t relate 
merely to workers producing and distributing our food, the one thing we 
cannot do without even in the pandemic (plus electricity and internet 
providers, at the very opposite end of bodily needs, but they are not 
exposed) – it’s the millions of invisible workers conveniently out of 
sight in faraway countries and their sweatshops. Capitalism is also 
a distribution of visibility, a politics of visibility, and with the sudden 
pandemic emergence of ‘essential’ workers some part of the invisible has 
become visible, only to be soon eclipsed. There is a class struggle in what 
you see or what you don’t, and with the occurrence of ‘essential’ workers 
there is the impression, or rather the fantasy, that one suddenly somehow 
sees the essence – namely, that we all need to eat and to use the net, 
at the minimal. Stomach or fantasy, as Marx put it on the first page of 
Capital, but they always overlap.
The contradictions and antagonisms of capitalism are 
becoming even more irreconcilable than before, especially 
during the lockdown or during the pandemic as such. Rich 
people need working poor people, so that they do not get 
infected and can still command the poor people to deliver 
their food, etc. It seems like it is impossible to think that 
capitalism has the ability to overcome or sublate them in 
any way in its own framework – and it seems increasingly 
unbelievable that it will not simply explode into many tiny 
pieces of structure (zonages, as Badiou would have it). On 
the other hand, capitalism never solved its problems, it only 
delayed them and transformed them so that they can be left 
unsolved. Where do you think we stand today, especially 
under the current intensified conditions? Does all this put 
an alternative, communism (whatever we precisely mean 
by this) on the agenda? Differently put, did the pandemic 
force us to consider a radical transformation of our economy, 
society, politics, etc., (in short: communism) or do you think 
the pandemic is separate from the insight into such an almost 
conceptual necessity?
One of the immediate consequences of Covid, I guess now prevailing, is 
the sense of fatigue. There was the crisis in the spring, and as it dragged 
on the sense of fatigue was already setting in, but that was still very 
limited as compared to its autumn repetition, this bad remake that we 
are facing now; this rehashing of a bad script is even more disastrous. 
Now we can’t even muster the proper emotional response, as we did 
with the original shock, with horror or anxiety or cynicism. This isn’t 
even frightening or an occasion for humor, not anymore, which makes it 
worse. Fatigue is the opposite of awakening, and when Benjamin brought 
up the dialectic at a standstill, it was meant as the state of maximum 
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tension which was to instigate awakening. The images of standstill, now 
again imposed on our cities under lockdown, seem to be oneiric, like the 
dreamlike Hollywood sequences (think of e.g. Vanilla Sky). But Benjamin’s 
point is that dream doesn’t pertain to the standstill, dream was what 
went before, i.e., capitalism and its business-as-usual, its reliance on 
progress etc., so that the standstill offers the chance to wake up from this 
protracted collective dream, the phantasmagoria. Now we seem to be at 
the point of excessive fatigue which rather instigates indifference and 
irritation. Can it bring us to some form of awakening? The accumulation 
of the quantity of exasperation and apathy leading to a ‘dialectical 
overturn’ into a new quality? I rather suspect that both the optimistic 
scenario of awakening and the pessimistic scenario of this dragging 
on into the bad infinity of dulled frustrated discontent may be off the 
mark. The accumulation of contradictions is such that this may explode 
in unpredictable ways. Of course I hope against hope and try to do 
what I can to keep the ‘communist’ scenario alive, in whatever incipient 
organizational forms it exists (also in Slovenia), and in the reliance 
on sparks that are in the air and may ignite anytime. It’s a harsh uphill 
struggle against the incredible human capacity to learn nothing from even 
the starkest lessons and to delude oneself till the last possible moment 
(and beyond). After the 2008 crisis there was the general feeling that ‘this 
can’t go on’, and now with the Covid and the concomitant intensification 
of antagonisms there is again ‘this can’t go on’. Come to think of it, given 
my age, this was the general feeling already in the aftermath of ’68, so 
in retrospect our generation spent a lifetime in this temporality, the 
looming breakdown of capitalism in its present form, the accumulation 
of contradictions, the receding breaking point. And I guess this 
stretches back to Marx’s time. But maybe when, after so many thwarted 
expectations, we all get resigned to the idea of the infinitely expandable 
capitalism and its temporality of infinite postponement, then a break 
may surprise us from some completely unexpected quarters. There is the 
danger of one delusion – of the infinite resilience of capitalism – being 
matched by another delusion – that of an imminent end. Capitalism 
is, perhaps since ever, the perspective of an end that doesn’t end. I do 
believe that this nightmare of a never-ending end has a limit, but this is a 
paradoxical belief where radical fatalism, as proposed by Frank Ruda in 
Abolishing Freedom, meets revolutionary will.
The very existence of philosophy has been questioned for a 
very long time now, at least since Hegel himself, for whom 
there were only failed attempts to do philosophy and thus 
there was no proper philosophy, well, almost before Hegel. 
From Stephen Hawking to the average neuro-biologist, there 
are quite a few who’d argue that it is better if there was no 
philosophy at all (because it does not help and is a waste 
of time anyhow). You belong to the kind of philosophers 
who passionately and rigorously defend the necessity of 
philosophy. Even, or precisely because it is for its own sake. 
How do you think of philosophy, perhaps with Hegel, in times 
of pandemic?
Defending philosophy, for its own sake, as a space of thought beyond 
any immediate utility and practical use, feels a bit, in these times, like 
a belief in magic. The magic that pure thought can have consequences, 
that persevering with it, as such and for its own sake, will make a 
difference – if thought is on the level of its task. There is, yet again, 
the peril of a delusion of grandeur that philosophy has been prone to 
throughout its history. We have such great ideas, if only people would 
heed them. But this idea, the idea of the idea, as it were, goes back to 
the origins of philosophy, to its basic stance stated first by Parmenides, 
of co-belonging of thought and being. That thought touches upon being, 
intersects with it, that it interrupts being (this is Hegel’s wonderful 
formulation, thought is interruption of being, Unterbrechung des Seins, so 
that neither thought nor being ‘exist’ independent of this interruption, a 
break). So this is not about giving pure thought free reign apart from the 
troublesome dirty worldly business, but about the capacity of thought, if 
properly practiced, to stir being, in the juncture of its universality and the 
singularity of a historical moment it belongs to, including and especially 
its dirt. I guess this stance is in my case experientially based in the 
beginnings of my involvement with philosophy, in the late sixties and the 
early seventies, when there was a heyday of both serious thought going 
around and the political action, the intoxicating intersection of the two. 
This was the moment that inspired the proper enthusiasm, and here I am, 
fifty years later, trying to show fidelity to that moment, against great odds. 
But I am of course fully aware that this can be a very conservative stance, 
the mythification of a certain period when everything seemed possible, 
philosophically and politically, and then everything went downhill ever 
since. The thing is not that the glorious moment is gone and the world has 
radically changed, so that one is like a stranded relic of some other times, 
the thing is rather that that moment happens now, if it’s worth anything. 
Berlin/Ljubljana/Prishtina, October 2020
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